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Introduction 
According to the mainstream of strategic management literature allocating resources is 
one of the major strategic activities to provide conditions for successful business perfor-
mance. The final output of the business strategy is translated into a budget. The budget in-
cludes all the strategic and operational funds demanded for implementing the business 
strategy. 
These strategic funds contain investments, increases in net working capital and devel-
opmental expenses. Whether these strategic funds follow strategy, as stressed by the pres-
criptive scholars on strategy, or whether strategy follows the process of formation of 
strategic funds, as enhanced by writers on financial theory, is still a matter of debate. 
A somewhat broader perspective on financial strategy takes into consideration the main 
activities, being providing the firm with the appropriate financial structure and funds to 
achieve the overall objectives, the measuring of outcomes of strategic options and the se-
lection of the best financial course of action. A particular interesting function of financial 
strategy is, according to Clarke (1988) to give competitive advantage trough a lower cost 
of funds and a flexible ability to raise capital. 
Taking into account this broader set of functions of financial strategy, it is still open 
how financial theory can contribute to the core decision in the process of strategy forma-
tion: the selection of strategic options. 
From the traditional point of view, financial theorists claim the use of pay-back period, 
internal rate of return, sensitivity analysis or capital project controls as key features for 
capital budgeting (Mills; 1988). In modern financial theory, however, the concept of net 
present value is the central theme. While writers on strategy formation and selection ad-
vocate completely different aspects to be included, as craft, creativity, experience and 
dedication (Mintzberg and Quinn; 1992). 
So, the question is, how to select strategic options? In this article we advocate the use of 
a stronger financial dimension into strategy-making. More specifically, we consider the 
issues involved in the selection of strategic options using option theory, as one of the con-
tributions to systematize decision-making processes on selection of strategic options. 
First we describe the characteristics of strategic options and the problems enhanced to 
the selection of options. Second we look into the modern financial theory on market 
value. Third, the contribution to decision-making on selecting strategic options is clari-
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fied. Fourth, some evaluative conclusions are drawn on contributions of financial theory 
to strategic management theory. 
Strategic Options 
Strategic options cover the alternatives the firm can exploit to maximize the market value 
of the firm. It is assumed that firms can exercise real options open to the organization. 
What options are meant? Strategic options can be classified according to the directions 
and methods of firm development. Porter introduced three generic strategic options based 
on two dimensions: scope and competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). 
The three generic strategies are as follows: 
a cost leadership strategy assumes getting competitive advantage trough cost based 
advantage from all sources 
a differentiation strategy assumes getting competitive advantage trough unique 
dimensions widely valued by buyers 
a focus strategy assumes the choice of a narrow competitive scope within a industry 
by selecting a segment or group of segments in the industry; in cost focus a firm 
seeks a cost advantage in its segments, while in differentiation focus a firm seeks dif-
ferentiation in its segments. 
Although these generic strategies are debatable as far as their nature concern (Johnson 
and Scholes; 1992), they illustrate the importance of core competence of the firm in the 
industry and the value chain. The directions in which the organization may choose to de-
velop within its generic strategy are developed by Ansoff (1965) and others. Using the 
two dimensions market development and product development, four strategic options are 
defined: 
Assuming an expected lower return on investment, firms may decide to withdraw from 
a market. Remaining the product-market combination, consolidation provides oppor-
tunities to reduce costs and keep up market share or step up product quality, offering 
means for competitive advantage. Market penetration chances mostly depend on the na-
ture of the market and the position of competitors. 
Table 1. Generic Strategies 
competitive advantage 
Competitive scope lower cost differentiation 
broad target cost leadership differentiation 
narrow target cost focus differentiation focus 
Table 2. Strategic Options 
Product 
Market present new 
present withdrawal market penetration product development 
new market development diversification 
32 MANAGEMENT OF AGRI-CHAINS 
STRATEGIC OPTIONS AND MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY 
In growing markets market penetration for new entrants is relatively easy, while in de-
clining markets market penetration is possible depending on the firms that exit from the 
market. 
The product development strategy may give competitive advantage in markets with 
short product life cycles. Market development assumes the firm maintains the range of 
products, while venturing into new market segments. 
Diversification may be related, assuming new product-market combinations that follow 
the competence of the firm, or non-related when these competence do not relate to the 
new product-market combinations. 
As far as the way the firm can achieve the overall objectives and generic strategies, dif-
ferent methods of sustaining competitive advantage are open to the firm. Within the value 
chain or across value chains the firm can drive down costs, create bases of differentiation 
and add value. Apart from vertical integration of the firm with another firm backwards or 
forwards in the value chain, numerous alternatives are open to the firm, enabling the 
strengthening of the relation between the firm and another firm as shown in Figure 1. 
Horizontal strategies exploit interrelationships across distinct but related business units 
or firms. If the firm can not cope with environmental demands from internal resources 
alone, arrangements for joint activities and alliances might occur. A wide variety of op-
tions exist, like joint-ventures, consortia, licensing, sub-contracting and functional co-
operations (see Figure 2). 
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venturing 
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arrangements 
Agents 
Joint-venture 
Info & Comm. 
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Take-over 
Co-making 
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Figure 1. Vertical linkages between firms or business units 
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Figure 2. Horizontal linkages between firms or business units 
Considering the financial and organizational dimensions of relatedness between firms 
or business units, some of the horizontal strategies are shown. 
In short, the firm seeking for a future course of action, may choose out of a wide range 
of potential strategic options. Identifying options is a prerequisite for the assessment of its 
potentiality and suitability. 
So, how to evaluate the value of options ? Therefore, we look into the selection criteria. 
Screening and selecting strategic options 
From strategic management theory many criteria have been introduced to screen and se-
lect strategic options. Johnson and Scholes (1992) distinguish suitability, based on the fit 
between the results of the strategic analysis and the option favored, feasibility, based on 
the notion of chances for successful implementation and acceptability, related to stake-
holders expectations. Within the limited space of this article we elaborate on the accept-
ability criterium. Acceptability is the likely return from a particular strategic option and 
refers to the goal of the firm. 
Modern financial theory assumes value maximization as the overall goal of the firm. An 
empirical study by Lanzillotti (1958) concludes that the two primary concerns of manage-
ment are long-run profitability and stability. These goals appear to be inconsistent, but the 
dilemma can be solved by assuming maximization of the market value of the sharehol-
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ders' wealth as corporate goal. This goal is equivalent to maximization of the market 
value of the existing stock as shown by for instance Levy and Sarnat (1986). 
The maximization of market value as corporate goal is supported by the participation 
theory (see Simon et al; 1950, and Rhenman and Stymne; 1965). In this both sociological 
as economic approach the organization is viewed as a coalition of participants who all 
contribute to the organization with rewards as incentives, although this view is criticized 
by Agency theorists. They claim that internal stakeholders incline to optimize their own 
agents rewards instead of the firms value. Survival of the organization is guaranteed as 
long as all participants are prepared to contribute. This is, of course, depending on the re-
wards. It is the task of the management to distribute the rewards in a way that is accept-
able to the participants and it is also its task to maximize the total rewards in order to 
achieve the maximal probability of survival, the goal with the highest priority of all goals, 
with an absolute priority (see Ijiri; 1965) above all other goals. An illustration of the par-
ticipant theory is given below. So, screening and selecting strategic options may be evalu-
ated by the acceptability criterium, measured by the maximization of the market value: 
the higher the option contribution to market value, the more acceptable the option is. 
Market value: the Firm in Real and Financial Markets 
Maximization of market value is not the only standard against which strategic options 
may be assessed. Another factor is risk the organization faces. The firm invests in real as-
Figure 3. Contributions and rewards 
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Figure 4. Cashflows in real and financial markets 
sets with money from the capital market and is dependent on both real and capital mar-
kets. 
The firm is an intermediary between the capital markets and the real markets on which 
the firm is operating. On real markets the firm has to make investment decisions and on 
capital markets it has to make financing decisions. The basic similarity between those de-
cisions is evident in the light of the value maximalization goal. 
"The decision to purchase a machine tool or to sell a bond each involve valuation of a 
risky asset. The fact that one asset is real and the other financial doesn't matter. In both 
cases we end up computing net present value." (Brealey and Myers, 1988). 
The financial markets are highly competitive, in fact they are efficient. The first study 
on this subject was made by Kendall (1953) and the classic study was made by Jensen 
(1964). There are three levels of market efficiency defined: 
1. Weak: Prices reflect all information contained in the record of past prices. 
2. Semistrong: Prices reflect not only all information contained in the record of past 
prices but also all published information. 
3. Hard: Prices reflect not only all information contained in the record of past 
prices and all published information but all the information that can be ac-
quired by fundamental analysis of the company and the economy. 
It is evident that the capital markets are efficient in at least the semistrong way and that 
the hard form of efficiency can be applied to at least the relative prices of stocks (Brealey 
and Myers, 1988). This implies that the expected value of capital market decisions is zero 
because all securities are fairly priced as they contain all relevant information. In other 
words, it is difficult to find financing schemes with net present values significantly differ-
ent from zero. In fact, this is the fundamental concept of efficient capital markets; if capi-
tal markets are efficient, then purchase or sale of any security at the prevailing price is 
never a transaction with a positive net present value. 
When a firm looks at capital investment decisions on real markets it does not assume 
that it is facing efficient markets. It may have just a few competitors or own some unique 
tangible or intangible asset. That is where positive net present values come from. 
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There has been a tremendous lot of research done about capital markets. Some thirty 
years ago the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was developed to explain market 
values of stocks. It was a development of the pioneering work by Markowitz (1958), who 
presented a model of portfolio selection based on covariances between all existing se-
curities. Assuming equal borrowing and lending rates it can be shown that all investors 
should choose the market portfolio in combination with borrowing or lending. This is 
known as the separation theorem and the original development of this theorem is due to 
Tobin (1958). 
In the following figure AB is the efficient frontier of all combinations of securities, P* is 
the market portfolio, rB the borrowing rate, and rL the lending rate. The line from the rates 
to P* is known as the capital market line, and shows the required rate of return at different 
levels of risk. 
The first article in which the CAPM was presented was written by Sharp (1964). Other 
founders of this approach are Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966) and Fama (1968). This the-
ory states that the required rate of return is equal to the risk free rate plus a risk premium 
based on non-diversible or systematic risk. Diversible or unsystematic risk can totally be 
reduced by diversification as shown in Figure 6. 
The non-diversible risk is measured by beta defined as 
A = covariance(m,i) variance (m) 
where m is the market portfolio and i the individual stock i. 
The required return of any risky asset fo) follows the security market line: 
n = r{ +ß(rm - rf) 
where rf the risk-free rate is and rm the required rate of market as a whole measured by a 
market index. In Figure 7 the security market line is pictured. 
Required rate of return 
Standard deviation 
Figure 5. The capital market line 
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Figure 6. Systematic and unsystematic risk 
beta 
Required rate of return 
Figure 7. The security market line 
However, the risk of a stock is a combination of business risk and risk due to financial 
leverage. For our purpose the risk of debt financing should be excluded. Assuming risk 
free debt the equation: 
Debt 
P Business P Equity 
Equity 
•+ß, Debr 
reduces to: 
Equity + Debt J uem Debt + Equity 
Equity 
ßßusiness PEquity Equity + Debt 
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In this way a benchmark can be found for valuation of a strategic option. All cash flows 
associated with an alternative can be reduced to a present value by using a beta of a firm 
with a risk equivalent to the alternative. As pointed out before, there hardly is an efficient 
market in real investment projects we need this link with the capital market. 
Assume that a firm has the opportunity to cooperate with another firm in a joint venture 
for production in the agribusiness sector. Other firms operating solely in this sector have a 
beta of about 1.5 and are financed with debt and equity in equal proportions. The capital 
market risk-free rate is 7 percent. Using the equation for calculating business beta: 
^L 
.5+ .5 "Business
 l
*^ *- - *- ' ' •> 
The appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate will be: 
r = .07+ .75* (.11-.07) = .10 
The project involves an investment of $ 1 million and will return an annual stream of 
equivalent cash flows the coming two years. The expected value is $ 570,000 a year. The 
present value of this project is: 
2 
NPV= - $ 1,000,000+ y ~ ^ ^ = - $ 10.744 
*-* (1 + .10)' 
t+1 
As the net present value is negative, the project should be rejected. 
This approach involves evaluating the total cash flows of the business units individ-
ually and the total cash flow of the firm in order to valuate the strategic option to its cur-
rent owners. 
Valuing Strategic Options 
The concept of real options was introduced by Myers (1977). The assets of a firm are two-
fold: 
1. Real assets with a market value independent of the firms' investment strategy 
2. Real options or possibilities real assets to acquire on favorable terms 
This is consistent with the Modigliani and Miller theory (1958) in which the market value 
of the firm consists of the present value of the current assets and the present value of 
growth opportunities. 
Both Myers (1984) and Kester (1984) emphasize the existence of a gap between finance 
theory and strategic planning and suggest that besides correct use of finance theory an ex-
tension is needed by the use of the concept of real options. In Kemna (1988) the theoreti-
cal development of real options is treated. 
In the context of strategic cooperation, a framework for an option pricing approach can 
be found in Stemne and Zuurbier (1992). 
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The valuation of European options (to be exercised on a particular day) is mostly based 
on the valuation formula of Black and Scholes (1973). The value of a European call op-
tion is: 
C(0) = SN (a) - EerTN(a - <rlT) 
where: S = market value of the stock 
E = exercise price 
T = number of periods to exercise date 
r = interest rate 
a = volatility 
a is defined as: 
ln( | ) + (r+0.5a2)r 
a = ;Vr 
N(a) is the cumulative normal distribution: 
N(a) = j-r==e-°-5x2dx 
-inf 
Using the put-call parity the value of a European put option is: 
P(0) = Ee -rTN(-a + (TV?7) - SN(-a) 
American options can be exercised during the whole period until expiration date. As an 
American call option never will be exercised before maturity the Black and Scholes for-
mula will hold, but an American put option could be exercised sometimes with profit be-
fore maturity. For this kind of options a binomial model (see Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein, 
1979) can be used. 
To illustrate the application of an option theory approach we use the following 
example. The management of a firm has to decide if they should maintain capacity for 
hardly profitable products. The capacity can be sold on the second-hand market and, of 
course, the current capacity can be expended if the market goes up. 
Using S(t) for the present value of future cash flows at time and ß for the cash flow that 
per year becomes realized, we get the following relationship: 
S(t) = S(t-l)*(l-ß) 
It is possible to sell the capacity involved at a fixed price (E). This is an American put-
option with E as the exercise price. 
The possibility of expansion (with the fraction f) is an American call-option with the in-
vestment outlay (I) as exercise price. 
In this case the current capacity has a value of $ 10 million and this value will decrease 
by 10 percent per year. The value on the second-hands market is $ 6 million and the capa-
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city can be expanded by 40 percent at a cost of $ 3 million. The value of the capacity can 
per year rise or go down by 50 percent. The risk-free interest rate (r) is 8 percent. The 
variables can be summarized as follows where the upward and downward swing are 
denoted by u and d, respectively: 
S(0)=$10 f = .4 
ß - .12 u =1.5 
E = $ 6 d = .5 
I = $ 3 r = .08 
The data seems hard to find in real life, but let us examine them more in detail. The value 
of the current capacity ($ 10 million) is the current market value which is easy to find for 
a firm on the stock exchange, in other cases this value has to be estimated. The annual de-
crease in market value (10 percent) should be estimated by management as the value on 
the second-hand market ($6 million) and the cost of expansion ($3 million). 
The variability of the value of the capacity (up- or downswing by 50 percent) is based 
on subjective probability assessment of management. The risk-free interest rate can hard-
ly be difficult to find. 
Assume that the options can be exercised at once or at the end of each of the next two 
years. Using the binomial method, the value of the production capacity in millions of dol-
lars one year ahead [S(l)] has two possibilities: 
S(l) = S ( 0 ) * u * ( l 
S(l) = S ( 0 ) * d * ( l 
ß) = $ 1 0 * 1.5*.88 =$13.2 
ß) = $ 1 0 * 0.5*.88 = $ 4.4 
The value of the production capacity after two years from now can take the following 
values: 
S(2) = S(0)*u2*(l-ß)2 = $ 1 0 * 2.25*.77 =$17.4 
S(2) = S(0)*u*d*(l-ß)2 = $ 1 0 * 1.5*.5*.77 = $ 5 . 8 
S(2) = S(0)*d2*(l-ß)2 =$10* .25* .77 =$ 1.9 
The binomial tree for the coming two years becomes: 
S(0) = 10 
•S(1) = 13.2 
S(1)= 4.4 
•S(2) = 17.4 
S(2)= 5.8 
"S(2)= 1.9 
Figure 8. Value of Production Capacity 
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The option to stop (P) is valuable only if S(t) is below the exercise price of $ 50 million 
and the option for expansion has a value of: 
C(2) = S(2) *f-l = S(2) *.5-$3 
If this value is positive. The tree can be completed by the option values where T(t) is the 
value of the combination of the call- and the put-option at time t: 
S(0) = 10 
T(0)=? 
S(1) = 13.2 
T(1)=? 
S(1)= 4.4 
T(1)=? 
"S(2) = 17.4 
T(2)= 4.0 
S(2)= 5.8 
T(2)= .2 
"S(2)= 1.9 
T{2) = 4.1 
Figure 9. Option Values after Two Years 
From the following relationship the probability of an upward change be determined: 
r
 (u-l)-(l-d) 
„ - 0 8 - ( - . 5 ) 
" - . 5 - ( - . 5 ) - 6 
The possible values of the options one year from now [T(l)] are: 
T ( l ) = {(.6 * $ 17.4 + (1 - .6) * $ 5.8}/1.08 = $ 2.2 
T ( l ) = { ( . 6 * $ 5.8 + ( l - . 6 ) * $ 4 . 1 } / 1 . 0 8 = $ 1 . 7 
But at time 1, when the option value is $ 2.2 exercising the call option is worth more: 13.2 
* . 4 - 3 = 2.3 
and at time 0 the value [T(0)] is: 
T(0) = {(.6 * $ 2.3 + (1 - .6) * $ 1.7}/1.08 = $ 1.9 
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The complete binomial tree becomes: 
S(0) = 10 — 
T(0)= 1.9 
|-S(1) = 13.2 
T(1)= 2.3 
L S(1 )= 4.4 
T(1)= 1-7 
S(2) = 17.4 
T(2)= 4.0 
S(2) = 5.8 
T(2)= .2 
S(2)= 1.9 
T(2)=4.1 
Figure 10. The Complete Binomial Tree 
The total value of the project becomes: 
10.0+1.9 = 11.9 — 
(wait) 
r 13.2+2.3 = 15.5 
(expand) 
L
 4.4+1.7 = 6.1 
(wait) 
17.4+4.0 = 
(expand) 
21.4 
5.8+.2= 6.0 
(stop) 
1.9+4.1 
(stop) 
6.0 
Figure 11. Total Value of the Project 
By the two options (to stop and to expand) the project is worth $1.9 million more than 
without these options. The best strategy is to wait, and thus keeping both options. This 
example shows the usefulness of option theory for screening and selecting options. 
Option theory: some critical notions 
Based on our arguments, selecting the preferred option is, among other criteria, based on 
acceptability by internal and external stakeholders. 
Real options are measured by market value, considering risk and the worth of real op-
tions. More specifically, one can hypothesize that option A is more preferred than option 
B,if and when 
1. A contributes more to the overall objectives of the firm, expressed by maximization 
of market value, than B; 
2. B contributes less to risk than B and 
3. A shows a higher value than B. 
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If these conditions prevail, internal and external stakeholders will perceive option A more 
acceptable than B. 
So far, these elaborations have shown their potential contribution to improving the 
quality of strategic decision making in general and selection of strategic option more spe-
cifically. However, some critical notions have to be considered. 
First, the option pricing theory developed for financial markets should be treated very 
carefully when used for valuing real options. Compared to financial markets, real markets 
are obviously less efficient. The option valuation is based on put-call parity. Investors can 
create two alternative strategies which yield the same income, regardless of the future 
stock price at expiration. The alternative to buy a call option is then equivalent to the al-
ternative to buy a stock and put option in combination with borrowing. As pointed out by 
Levy and Sarnat (1986) this is true only in perfect markets. However in real, non-perfect 
and even far from efficient markets the put-call parity should be used with great caution. 
Second, option theory is focussed on the maximization of market value as perceived by 
internal and external stakeholders. However, internal and external stakeholders do not 
necessarily share the same ideas on the how and what of the maximization of market 
value. In fact, under opportunism conditions shirking behavior is likely to occur among 
agents, such as the board of directors allocating an increase in income to themselves, vis-
a-vis the interests of external stakeholders such as investors and stockholders. More in 
general, organizations, as defined by Fama and Jensen (1983), as nexus of contracts be-
tween principals and agents, are assumed to show differences of interests between them. 
Consequently, maximization of market value is a perceptual phenomenon, a social con-
struct, expressed by internal and external stakeholders, poses a theoretical problem. The 
nexus of contracts view of the firm reduces to conceiving the firm as an efficient bundle 
of skills, competencies and shared ideas on maximization of market value. 
Third, option theory poses a methodological problem. Considering market value, 
potential cash flows and risks as the major concepts in the paradigm, the question of 
measuring these concepts has to be clarified. If firms are registered on the stock market, 
the market value of the firm over time can be approximated. However, what, if the firm is 
not operating on the stock market. How can the market value be measured, then? More-
over, how to estimate the potential cash flow and risks, if information in that respect is 
scarce or even unreliable? 
Fourth, option theory offers a set of criteria to evaluate the potentiality of a real option. 
However, as we discussed earlier, what about the other criteria that are deployed, such as 
suitability of the option, consonance with the firms' policy or consistency over time ? The 
process of selection of options may well be regarded as a multi-criteria evaluation. If that 
is the case, how shall the relative weight of the option theory contribution be compared 
with other criteria? 
In short, option theory promises to improving the quality of strategic decision making, 
but between promises and real contributing some barriers have to be taken first. 
Conclusion 
In this article we discussed option theory within the context of the process of selecting 
strategic options. We referred to Brealey and Myers (1990) who challenged strategy 
theorists and scholars in modern financial theory to bridge the gap between them. We ela-
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borated on the potential use of option theory, considering the major concepts: market 
value, potential cash flow and risk. 
Based on our argument, we conclude that option theory may contribute to the under-
standing of strategy making processes in general and the process of selecting strategic op-
tion specifically. 
However, some problems have to be solved. Problems that deal with the basic assump-
tions of option theory, as the maximization of market value in view of internal and exter-
nal stakeholders, the intransparency of real markets, the measurement of the basic 
concepts and their relative weight compared with other selection criteria. 
The importance of the option theory with respect to strategy making is that is gives a 
source of information that may raise the quality of decision- making. In that respect, the 
contribution is comparable with other technical-financial instruments, such as funds-flow 
analysis, break-even analysis, sensitivity analysis and cost-benefit analysis. These instru-
ments may clarify the attractiveness of strategic options and, by that, create a consensus 
between internal and external stakeholders. 
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